The 'special relationships' formed by Spain, France and Britain with their former colonies demonstrate that even ties initially based on political and economic domination transform the identities of both parties. In this study, we show how European post-colonial behavior in Africa, Asia and Latin America has been inspired by historically rooted subjective conceptions of national identity and norms of interstate community. We employ a constructivist approach to provide a generalizable, middle-range explanation of foreign policies that do not fit typical realist or economistic notions of rationality. Instead, we find that Spanish, French and British policies toward their former empires follow patterns suggested by colonialist and feminist theories of International Relations. By applying this approach to post-colonial relations, we show the importance of ideas and norms in the construction of unequal power relations and expand the constructivist research program.
European nations and their ex-colonies. We document the privileged role of post-colonial ties in French, Spanish and British foreign policies, and make two linked arguments about them. Our main claim is that only identity explains why Europeans sustain special economic, political and institutional relationships with otherwise ordinary (even unappealing) partners. With a partial exception for Spain and Latin America, the material returns to European policies have been meager and declining for decades. We do not argue that material incentives are entirely absent, but rather that they are perceived through the lenses of specific, post-imperial ideas and identities. Second, the Europeans consistently describe their ties with ex-colonies in the language of 'family', and this rhetoric is significant. The family metaphor provides a partial but important key to understanding the reproduction of these relationships.
These arguments draw on several literatures. Constructivist theory provides the foundations. Most constructivist work on post-imperial ties, however, has focused on autonomous change in the normative framework of North-South relations (for instance, on decolonization and the rise of economic aid regimes) rather than on the relative continuity of particular transnational identities within that global framework. Our more direct empirical antecedents lie in the historical literature on colonialism, wherein national identities occupy an important (if not quite central) place. The focus on familial rhetoric, lastly, draws on recent work on metaphors and feminist IR theory.
Our argument can be stated as specific propositions:
1. The relationships between European powers and their former colonies are more important and enduring than explanations based on conventional, objective national interests would predict. 2. British, French and Spanish perceptions of self-interest derive not just from current material circumstances, but also from historical relationships with their ex-colonies. 3. Historically conditioned notions of collective, familial relations motivate the European powers to maintain distinctive types of relations with their former colonies. 4. The behaviors of Britain, France and Spain should be traceable not to the demands of an anarchic self-help system but to the shared norms and ideas of distinct communities of states. 5. The construction of these communities of states as 'families' enhances the perceived value and the normative character of the relationships.
(1999: 227) argues, conceptions of self necessarily 'exist only in relation to Others'. His central argument is that the character of international systems is not a product of formal anarchy, but of the nature of culturally defined relationships. He identifies three 'cultures of anarchy', based on three fundamental role types -enemies, rivals and friends. Collective identity is essentially a special type of friendship, one in which the Self identifies with the Other (Wendt, 1999: Ch. 7) . The relationship is thus 'empathetic rather than instrumental' (Wendt, 1994: 386) . Collective identities are worked out through ongoing interactions and dialogues, in which symbolic exchanges play an important role (Barnett, 1998) . The post-imperial relations under study in this article display some attributes of collective identity. The ties between the former imperial powers and their ex-colonies are primarily those of friendship, rather than rivalry or enmity. Furthermore, it is a distinctive type of friendship, which its participants describe in the language of 'family'. The notion of family implies ties of loyalty and solidarity, not just arm's-length exchange, and thus of particular obligations. In other words, the identities of Britain, France and Spain are shaped in part by relationships with their ex-colonies, and the familial construction of those ties produces a sense of ongoing solidarity and responsibility. Our conception is thus compatible with Lumsdaine's (1993) argument that foreign aid is not fully explicable in terms of instrumental rationality, but stems in part from a perception of moral responsibility. More broadly, the emergence of post-imperial families of states is part of a larger shift in ideas and norms regarding colonization. Whereas colonies were once seen as legitimate possessions of the great powers, and part of their mission civilisatrice, decolonization became the international norm in the latter half of the 20th century (Jackson, 1990; Puchala and Hopkins, 1983; Strang, 1991) . The self-described families of states represent a distinctive set of identities and norms in the period since decolonization. Furthermore, other states acknowledge the distinctive status of the post-imperial families of states, affording to the former imperial powers implicit special rights and prerogatives for providing assistance to, or intervening within, their families. That is, the international community often looks to Britain, France and Spain to step in when circumstances seem to call for an outside role. Thus the United States and other countries have more or less expected France to act in Chad or Burundi, and Britain in Sierra Leone.
If, as a constructivist logic suggests, roles and identities are shaped by shared ideas, and reproduced and modified by ongoing interactions, then the transformation of imperial into familial ties is understandable. Evolving international norms delegitimated the possession of colonies, and pushed toward decolonization. But independence did not erase the ties that had developed between the European powers and their colonies. The notion of a family of states was compatible both with the norm (and the fact) of decolonization, and with the reality of ongoing ties that were the product of historical relationships. Naturally, the Europeans and the current populations of their former colonies look at the same history with widely divergent understandings and interpretations. It may well be that the former colonies participate in post-imperial associations in the expectation of deriving material benefits, like aid, trade and investment. But material interests do not explain the motivations of the former colonizers. What seems to matter most to the former imperial powers, though in varying degrees, is a bond that they see as the product of their shared past.
Explaining Colonialism and Post-Colonialism
Like IR theory in general, studies of colonialism and post-colonialism were traditionally dominated by objective-interest theories. The best-known explanation of colonialism is economic -capitalist European societies were driven abroad by their objective needs for markets and raw materials. For Lenin, imperial expansion was a necessity for national monopolies that had exhausted potential profits at home (Lenin, 1939) . For John Hobson (1965) , a narrower coalition of special interests drove their governments abroad in search of new investments. Realist scholars counter with a geopolitical thesis -power competitions between European states, and the weakness of the extra-European periphery, gave the former objective interests in dividing up and/or stabilizing the latter (Cohen, 1973; Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; Langer, 1935; Robinson, 1986; Taylor, 1980; Waltz, 1979: 37) . More nuanced accounts combine economic and geopolitical elements (Doyle, 1986; Kiernan, 1982) .
The same two views inform most social science work on post-colonial relations. For neo-Marxists, European economic exploitation after decolonization simply became less formal in 'neo-colonial' relationships. Many even see 'aid as imperialism', with European governments subsidizing their own industries' continued monopolies in the Third World (Hayter, 1971; Linear, 1985; Magdoff, 1969; Mende, 1973; Wood, 1986) . For realists, 'foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy' (Morgenthau, 1963) . Like earlier imperialism, post-colonial links reflect rational maneuvering for greater power and security (Gilpin, 1987; Knorr, 1973; Liska, 1960) .
Scholarly work in a third vein, however, sees identity as crucial to explaining colonial and post-colonial ties. Many early observers were skeptical of the objective economic or geopolitical payoffs of colonial adventures. Schumpeter (1955) saw subjective identities, not objective incentives, leading Europeans abroad; if imperialism was grounded in the demands of certain social classes, these classes pursued empires out of atavistic notions of conquest rather than clear 'interests'. Others emphasized the economic 'colonial myth' of easy riches outside overdeveloped Europe -and that these hopes were rarely realized (Brunschwig, 1960; Gann and Duignan, 1967; Southworth, 1977 Southworth, [1931 ; Valette, 1994) . A few scholars analyze post-colonial ties similarly. Hook (1995) finds that historical legacies must be included to understand 'national interests in foreign aid '. McKinlay (1979) shows statistically that earlier colonial ties, not current trade or political relationships, best predict the distribution of European aid. An enormous canon supports these analyses with more literary arguments about the construction and reproduction of post-colonial discourse and culture (Bhabha, 1994; Doty, 1996; Said, 1979; Spivak, 1987) .
Our argument builds on the insights of this third perspective on Europeans' 'interests' in their ex-colonies. Again, we allow that the material interests of many ex-colonies in these special relationships may be clearereconomic aid, assistance with external and internal state security and ties to a powerful spokesman in the international community may be sufficient motivations (though we suspect, as suggested above, that these identities strongly shape both sides of the relationship). An explanation of the motivations of European governments, however, must begin with identity. Within an evolving global regime for North-South relations, Europeans' strategies have been further structured by more geographically specific identities. Even as the rules of the broad 'sovereignty game' changed with decolonization, and despite tremendous material change since that normative shift, the 'families' with which European states choose to play the game have remained remarkably consistent.
Metaphorical Families of Nations
Our argument is not simply that 'identity matters' in these post-colonial relations, but that the pervasive metaphor of 'families of nations' structures them in particular ways. This claim develops a straightforward but littlenoted implication of constructivist thinking. In a world admitting of many interpretations, we should expect people to build identities around parallels to familiar objects and situations. This should be particularly true in the relatively distant and abstract realm of International Relations. Metaphors and analogies are thus likely to provide some of the key materials in identity construction in IR.
Metaphors equate things or situations figuratively, implying that they can be understood to some degree as similar ('All the world's a stage'). Analogies claim more literally that things or situations are similar, sharing common properties ('We face another Munich in Vietnam'). Several scholars have traced the direct effects of historical analogies on foreign policy decision-making (Hoffman, 1968; Khong, 1992; May, 1973) . With support from a large literature in linguistics and philosophy, we suggest that the more figurative logic of metaphors may have equally (or more) significant effects in establishing the notions and categories around which relationships are organized (Black, 1962; Lakoff, 1980 Lakoff, , 1990 Zashin and Chapman, 1974) . As Black (1962:: 41) explains:
The effect . . . of calling a man a 'wolf' is to evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on. . . . A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of implications about [the man]. . . . Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in 'wolf-language' will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others -in short, organizes our view of man.
The family metaphor in post-colonial relations has similar effects. Largely adopted during colonial times to justify European 'parental' dominance, this long-repeated rhetoric organized European views of their interests over time.
To highlight the particular organizing principles of the family metaphor, we turn to feminist analysis. Like constructivism, feminist theory in International Relations deconstructs seemingly neutral or natural power relations, with an emphasis on revealing the logic of interactions concealed by being labeled as 'cultural' or 'domestic' (hence, the principle that 'the personal is political'). As one theorist puts it, 'One learns to ask whether anything that passes for inevitable, inherent, ''traditional'' or biological has in fact been made' (Enloe, 1989: 3) . Feminist theory's research program goes beyond analysis of the global role and status of women, to interrogate the gendered basis of international structures and discourses of authority, sovereignty and community (Tickner, 1992) . Feminist theory elucidates the content of these social relations with the powerful insight that gender identities and family roles provide models, means and motives for many other forms of power and privilege. 'Thus to explain why any country has the kind of politics it does, we have to be curious about how public life is constructed out of struggles to define masculinity and femininity' (Enloe, 1989: 135) . We use the insights of a structural feminist approach to develop the personal and gendered implications of the family metaphor. In contrast to other metaphors like 'partners' or 'enemies', the family metaphor constructs post-colonial relationships as domestic, paternalistic and Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz: After Empire dedicated to reproduction. Domestic relations are 'inside' the nation, not subject to normal foreign policy principles (Walker, 1993) . Widely diffused acceptance of this 'natural' relationship suspends international norms of sovereignty and legitimates high levels of post-colonial intervention; even great power rivals or regional hegemons accept the presence of eximperialists -just as neighbors do not intervene in domestic violence. Paternalistic relationships involve higher obligation and lower autonomy than other forms of International Relations. Furthermore, paternalism maintains the hierarchical position of the former imperial parent, even when it has been objectively surpassed by the former colony. Relationships of cultural reproduction go beyond an instrumental promotion of ideology and culture as a means of domination; cultural reproduction becomes a purpose of the relation, pursued beside and beyond any material advantages it may confer. This helps to explain the heavy emphasis on language, educational ties, cultural exchange, religion and sport in families of nations.
More generally, a feminist analysis suggests why the European powers have invested in their 'families', via a feminist reading of the construction of nationalism through empire. The nation is commonly described in familial language, usually coded as a woman/mother (although the state is generally symbolically male). Nationalist discourse defines security as defense of the boundaries of the (female) nation by (male) citizens -often with explicit analogies to patriarchal defense of the boundaries of female family members. Relatedly, imperial rule is frequently legitimated as a defense of subordinate colonized women and an extension of national identity and power (Pettman, 1996: 49) . By extension, the maintenance of a post-imperial 'family' protects the patriarchal nation's boundaries, security and symbolic potency.
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In sum, then, post-colonial powers have formed identity-based foreign relationships based on metaphorical families of nations. Feminist theory leads us to expect state leaders to translate into international politics patriarchal modes of domesticity, authority and cultural reproduction. Thus in the colonial era, the European powers understood their colonial relationships in terms of a family metaphor, with a dominant patriarch who was responsible for protecting as well as instructing its dependent peoples. But metaphors, like most social constructs, are malleable. As the political reality of the relationships changed with decolonization, the family metaphor adapted. The new family was one with grown and independent children. The family metaphor was thus neither haphazard nor trivial. Though based initially in gendered constructions of International Relationships, the family metaphor was durable enough to survive decolonization, and to adapt to new realities.
European Journal of International Relations 8(2) Alternative Explanations
Other perspectives in International Relations might offer quite different accounts of post-imperial relationships. Before turning to the empirical analysis, we describe two potential alternatives and briefly discuss what we see as their crucial shortcomings. Neo-realist theories -long defining the dominant approach to IR -direct attention away from the social or normative dimensions of international politics and toward the material (Bull, 1995: 36) . Whatever regularities exist in International Relations, in the neorealist view, can be explained in terms of underlying objective economic or security interests. The problem with this view, as we suggested earlier, is that interests do not exist in a purely objective way; they emerge out of the interactions among material conditions, social norms and ideas, and relationships with other actors. The empirical record, however, provides the clearest refutation of the neo-realist view. As we will show, the notion of the post-imperial family of nations has persisted in Spain, France and Britain despite a dramatic decline in the economic and strategic importance of the former colonies. In some instances, we can even show that the metaphor of the post-imperial family has shaped the perception of material interests, not vice versa.
The second alternative to our theoretical approach would be one based on domestic politics. There are two variants of the domestic politics argument, one based on current theories of political economy and the other based on a version of bureaucratic politics. The standard political economy account of foreign policy is not compatible with our perspective, nor with the empirical evidence. In the political economy approach, the foreign policy behaviors of governments reflect the interests of the dominant domestic economic sectors, or coalitions of sectors, as these are mediated by the political institutions of the state (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996; Milner and Keohane, 1996) . As international openness increases, those sectors that gain the most from cross-border exchange and investment will increase their domestic political strength, and will therefore have a greater influence on foreign policy. The argument is plausible in general, but it would not explain the persistence of special ties between France, Spain and Britain and their former colonial possessions. Indeed, as internationalization has proceeded over the past 25 years, the economic and political importance of businesses with activities in the former colonies has diminished. Firms and industries with broader international and, especially, European ties have increased their economic and political clout. Indeed, Paris, Madrid and, more reluctantly at first, London have all decisively anchored their foreign economic policies in the European Union. The standard political economy argument would thus lead one to expect the disappearance of post-imperial families of nations; as their economic importance declines, relations with ex-colonies would be submerged in broader policies driven by global or European ties. But this is not what has happened, as subsequent sections will show.
A domestic politics argument based on economic interests might be salvaged with a more modest claim, namely, that those firms and industries with significant activities in the ex-colonies would retain influence on that policy niche. In other words, though foreign economic policy-making would largely shift to Europe and the world, policies toward the former colonies might still be shaped by those groups with financial stakes there. The problem with this argument is that it gets the causation backward. Of course businesses will argue for policies that benefit them. But why would policymakers favor companies with colonial ties, when the economic importance and political clout of European and globally oriented firms are so much greater? It is insufficient to point simply to the narrow sectoral interests of British banana companies or French mining concerns to explain the broad pattern of state-to-state relations. These narrow, private interests are able to insist on the preservation of special ties with the ex-colonies only because of the 'family' identification that is more broadly accepted. If firms with interests in the ex-colonies do obtain policies that they prefer, it is because the policy-making establishment, or some influential part of it, already favors the maintenance of post-imperial relations. It is the government that makes use of domestic groups, not vice versa, a point that leads to the second variant of the domestic politics argument.
The second domestic politics argument has many affinities with the bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy (Allison, 1971 ). This perspective is entirely compatible with our theoretical framework, but would elaborate it at a different level of analysis (the domestic). In this account, it is not domestic economic interests that drive post-imperial policies in France, Spain and Britain, but rather segments of the foreign policy-making elite itself. That is, those parts of the government's foreign policy apparatus that have traditionally managed relations with the ex-colonies seek to maintain the importance of those ties, even if traditional economic and security interests have diminished. The motives of these foreign policy actors could be various. They may be acting out of narrow bureaucratic selfinterest, to preserve the budgets, personnel and influence of their specific offices. But the motives need not be self-regarding in that material sense. Members of the foreign policy elite whose professional responsibilities have focused on the ex-colonies will have both specialized knowledge of those countries and working relationships (networks) with their counterparts in them. The expertise and the networks would almost certainly generate a policy perspective that valued the ex-colonial ties, quite apart from narrow, bureaucratic self-interests. Indeed, as the case studies show, there have always been, in France, Spain and Britain alike, clusters of foreign policy professionals who supported the nurturing of family ties with former colonies. Though the case studies refer to those actors, and the parts of the government where they have their institutional homes, a detailed analysis of their composition and activities is unnecessary for our thesis and would carry us far beyond the scope of this article. Still, the bureaucratic elites argument is fully compatible with our own, as those elites are important agents in the construction of social interests.
Europe's Special Relationships
A few simple statistics show that France, Spain and Britain maintain very tangibly 'special' ties to their former colonies. The percentages of their national foreign aid programs targeted to their respective ex-colonies greatly exceed the OECD average level of aid to these destinations (see Table 1 ).
Still more strikingly, this aid relationship has persisted with little change despite the progressive normalization of underlying economic ties of trade and investment. French and British direct economic interests in their excolonies have steadily converged on OECD averages, to around 1-2 percent of trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa and 5-10 percent of trade and investment with the Commonwealth (see Table 2 ). Rather than flowing from salient economic benefits for the metropoles, these special relationships have largely persisted in spite of increasingly ordinary trade and investment links. Recent Spanish investment in Latin America is an exception to the trend, but we argue below that this is a result, more than a cause, of postimperial ties. The qualitative evidence of political, social, and institutional ties presented below echoes and amplifies these statistics. Relationships in post-imperial families neither look nor operate like standard International Relations.
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France's 'Historic Mission' in Sub-Saharan Africa
Since decolonization, France's former colonies have received a steadily declining share of its trade and private investments. Their ambiguous geopolitical importance has clarified into insignificance, especially in their core in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, most French policy-makers' analysis of their interests in the old Empire remains remarkably consistent. After four decades and massive global change, special ties and disproportionate aid to Africa remain a fundamental part of French foreign policy. If growing debates in France in the 1990s introduced more conditionality into support for African states, they brought little change in French aid patterns. As one fairly recent analysis concludes:
For better or worse, French relations with the Francophone states are not simply on a 'state-to-state' basis, with all the individual self-sufficiency such a phrase implies . . . the strength of these connections makes it difficult to depict French-African relations in terms of relations between states, as the conventions of analysis and practice in international affairs presume. (Staniland, 1987: 51) As decolonization became an active issue in the 1950s, well-developed defenses of French colonial policies became arguments for post-colonial ties. France had sought colonies to claim the vast untapped wealth of Africa, to bolster itself strategically against other Great Powers and to extend the 'civilizing mission' and glory of French culture. For many elites on right and left, decolonization did not alter these goals. An entity called 'Eurafrique' remained the key to France's future. Given the 'obvious geographical complementarity that links Africa and Europe', France was the center of a union 'which nature itself seems to impose ' (Lininger-Goumaz, 1972: 23; Zischka, 1952) . Only by developing Africa could France balance against a reviving Germany, and only with Africa could Europe balance against the US and USSR (Nord, 1956: 11) . Militarily, the French retreat to Africa in World War II ostensibly displayed its strategic importance. French generals argued that the advent of ballistic missiles made Africa still more important, since only bases there were beyond Soviet reach (Chipman, 1989: 79; Maury, 1958: 104) . Culturally, the education and perfection of African societies remained France's duty. For conservatives, the relationship was paternal; for liberals, it was fraternal -but either way, wrote one French deputy, Eurafrique was 'a family discussion' (Nord, 1956: 122) . This analysis was not without its critics. Parisian journalist Raymond Cartier advanced what came to be known as the cartieriste positionEurafrica's potential was far outweighed by France's aid burden (Sorum, 1977: 202) . French trade was rapidly reorienting to Europe, with the Empire's share decreasing from its 1930s zenith of 30 percent to closer to 10 percent in 1960. Militarily, if north Africa was the crucial staging ground for the French nuclear bomb program, all of Africa would soon be within reach of Soviet missiles. Politically, defeat in Indochina and mounting tension in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria showed the potential liabilities of a continued presence. Geographically, since 'Africa' in French discourse meant south of the Sahara (the north African Maghreb being categorized since colonial times with the Middle East), the notion of a 'natural' link oddly ignored the intervening obstacles of a sea, mountains and the world's largest desert.
But cartieriste views remained exceptional, and had little impact on policies. In 1956-8, the French insisted that maintenance of special ties to the colonies was a basic condition to the creation of the European Economic Community, prioritized even over French demands on metropolitan agriculture or industrial safeguards (Frank, 1992; Girault, 1987) . 4 In 1958-9, as decolonization suddenly became reality, the French tried to preserve the tightest possible Franco-African links. After failing to persuade African states to be satisfied with partial autonomy in a 'French Community', new leader Charles de Gaulle quickly signed bilateral treaties of 'cooperation' with 18 new states in sub-Saharan Africa. Through these accords, France kept a direct role in the new states' economic, military, education, judicial and cultural policies. All their foreign reserves were held by the French Treasury, which continued to manage its colonial currency (the CFA franc). Their budgets were directly dependent on French aid. African schools and judiciaries were still largely run by French officials (Decraene, 1970) . French officers remained in direct command of most of their armies, especially in the 11 states where treaties provided for French intervention upon invitation. In the early 1960s, the French helped suppress internal disorders in Cameroon, Mauritania, Senegal, Congo, Gabon, Niger and Chad (Chipman, 1989: 124; Lellouche and Moisi, 1979; Luckham, 1982) . These vast institutional links concretized the 'family' rhetoric, building vested interests and veto points into French policy-making in ways that further ensured policy continuity.
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De Gaulle's 'cooperation policy' was justified with the earlier rationales of Eurafrique, including its familial vocabulary. Economically, de Gaulle and his African-policy advisor, Jacques Foccart, insisted that the 0.5 percent of French GDP sent in aid to sub-Saharan Africa annually in the early 1960s was 'a good investment' (Corbett, 1972: 119; Grosser, 1984: 178) . Paradoxically, they also explained that it was France's 'historic mission' to accept the burden of aiding Black Africa. More consistently, they held that French leadership in Africa was crucial to its continued role as a Great Power in global affairs. It was 'one of the means that remains for France to shine' in the world (Grosser, 1984: 178) . Thus 'Père de Gaulle' (as he was openly called by several African leaders) presided over a highly personalized network of contacts that not only supported the new states, but provided for African leaders' families, private secretaries and bodyguards (Clapham, 1996: 90-1) . Commentators regularly noted the 'father and son' relationship between 'de Gaulle and his Francophone children' (Adamolebun, 1978; Bourgi, 1980: 459; Foccart, 1995: 219; Golan, 1981; Wauthier, 1995: 163 ). The 'bad child' that insisted most on early independence in 1958, Sekou Touré of Guinea, was immediately ostracized, losing French technical and economic assistance (Foccart, 1995: 165-75) . 6 The domestic character of these ties was also reflected in France, where French residents of the ex-colonies were unrepresented in the High Council of French Citizens Abroad (Corbett, 1972: 164) . In French eyes, they were not truly abroad.
Despite increasing signs that 'Eurafrique' held little material promise, and persistent cartieriste criticisms to that effect, French policies towards subSaharan Africa hardly changed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Relations with the Maghreb were fractured after Algerian independence in 1963, ending the geographical continuity of the Empire. Economically, trade with Africa (including the Maghreb) fell to 7-8 percent of French imports and exports by the late 1970s. Private French investments pulled back to a few large mining projects (Hugon, 1982; Staniland, 1987: 53) . Yet bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa remained steady in absolute terms. While this meant a decline relative to GDP, a simultaneous fall in aid to other regions increased its share of French aid overall to over 50 percent by the early 1970s. French personnel in Africa slowly increased in the 1970s, from around 9000 to 12,000 (Adamolebun, 1978: 38) . Military aid, also steady through the early 1970s, began to rise in the mid-1970s. French military forces were gradually moved out of Africa, but only to be stationed in southern France under the explicit label of 'Intervention Forces'. New interventions took place in Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Mauritania, Zaire and Central Africa in the 1970s to prop up threatened regimes (or, in the Central African Republic, to assist a coup).
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The personnel and rhetoric behind these policies was even more constant. Foccart ran African policies under de Gaulle's successor, President Georges Pompidou, as did his long-time deputy (René Journiac) under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Pompidou -suspected by orthodox Gaullists of caring less about French grandeur than de Gaulle -quickly reaffirmed that 'the cooperation policy . . . is a permanent and basic element of French policy' (Diallo, 1992; Le Monde, 1970: 4) . So did Giscard and his Socialist successor, François Mitterrand. Mitterrand ignored his party's calls for breaking relations with the more repressive African regimes in the early 1980s, and eventually installed his own son Jean-Christophe in Foccart's role (Favier and Martin-Roland, 1990: 327-38; Védrine, 1996: 337-9; Wauthier, 1995: 429-54) . French geopolitical, moral, and economic justifications were similarly unchanged. Giscard proclaimed that annual Franco-African summits represented 'a natural and selective association' of states and 'a convergence of destinies' (Bach, 1985; Bourgi, 1980: 460) . His Foreign Minister noted in 1981 that Africa 'is the only continent which is still within the measure of France, within reach of its means. The only continent where she can still, with 500 men, change the course of history' (De Guiringaud, 1982) . French military officials still argued that France had 'primordial strategic interests' in sub-Saharan Africa (Méry, 1985) . Mitterrand -one of the loudest champions of Eurafrique in the 1950s 8 -maintained that African weakness 'gave us the duty' to extend aid (Védrine, 1996: 339) . Economically, Foccart claimed implausibly in 1983 that the French economy earned a 280 percent return for each franc of French public aid (Grosser, 1984: 178; Figaro-Magazine, 1983 ).
9 One ex-'cooperation' official still argued in 1985:
Africa remains for France the partner closest historically, closest geographically and culturally, surest sentimentally, and -last but not least -in the medium term, the most useful economically. (Ferrandi, 1985: 52) The 'Eurafrique' theme in French policies finally weakened as France turned towards the European Community in the late 1980s, but the notion and reality of special Franco-African relations did not. The focus on Africa was slightly diluted by Mitterrand's move to alternate biannual FrancoAfrican summits with wider summits of all Francophone countries, but a rising French cultural budget allowed for 'Francophonie' projects without diverting funds from Africa. French alignment on orthodox monetary policies led to greater pressure in France to make African aid conditional on economic reform, and the geopolitical revolutions of 1989 convinced Mitterrand to place some emphasis on additional conditions of progress in democratization. Yet French policy-makers continued to worry paternalistically that either kind of conditions could throw Africa into chaos. ThenMinister for Cooperation Edwige Avice wrote of internal French debates in 1993 in familial terms:
French attitudes hesitate between the temptation of a prolonged maternity, justified by (the legacy of) colonialism, which would maintain a supportive influence and presence . . . and a willful incitation to passage to adulthood, which could liberate much resentment and ingratitude against us. (in Michalof, 1993: 8) In the 1990s, this choice between 'supportive influence' and more arm'slength, conditional ties finally became a more open debate (Bayart, 1995; Chesnault, 1990) . But if more contestation and conditionality in the 1990s may have marked 'the end of an era' in Franco-African relations, this did not come close to 'banalizing' this special relationship (Cumming, 2000; Smith, 1997) . Economically, the French cushioned a long-building devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 (by 50 percent) by forgiving most sub-Saharan debts, and convincing most other industrialized states to do the same. Aid has grown since the late 1980s, though within slightly tighter conditionality. Militarily, French interventions in the 1990s have been mostly limited to the protection or evacuation of French citizens, though actions in Rwanda, the Central African Republic, Gabon and the Congo were widely seen as reminiscent of French 'stabilization' in the 1960s (Coudurier, 1998: 312-14; Krop, 1994) . Perhaps the clearest sign of recent continuity in French policies was the reappearance of Jacques Foccart as African advisor to Gaullist premier Jacques Chirac in 1986-8, and his unofficial advisory role to Chirac as President from 1995 until Foccart's death in 1997. The networks that link Paris and African capitals into a familial 'village' are still robustly in place (Ici-Survie, 1996; Observatoire permanent de la Coopéra-tion française, 1998). It is not only narrow vested interests that keep France from severing these ties. Rhetoric in the broader political circles around Chirac (and parts of the left as well) suggests that these links still draw on deeper, wider legitimacy. Recent Gaullist Minister of Cooperation Jacques Godfrain urged his compatriots, 'Beware of the carteriste temptation!' Thanks to this tie to Africa, France will never be Liechtenstein or even Germany. We are a special country in Europe. At the United Nations, thanks to Africa, we carry more weight than our population, our land area or our GDP. Africa is a formidable lever for us. Our small country, with its small strengths, can move the planet because we have relations of amity and intimacy with fifteen or twenty African countries (Godfrain, 1998: 15) From an outsider's point of view. however, sub-Saharan Africa's actual contribution to French geopolitical weight seems negligible -or a liability, as in widespread criticisms of French actions in Rwanda. These countries remain 'so poor as to offer no real direct economic benefit to France' (Chipman, 1989: 189) . This does not mean that French policy-makers have somehow gone against their 'real interests' in Africa. To explain the particular interests they have perceived, however, we must begin with national identity.
'Autumn of the Patriarch': Spain and Latin America
Spain's Latin American policies have of course been influenced by what could be called the post-colonial syndrome. Spain owes a special allegiance to the former colonies, and vice versa. Their common culture, religion, and shared historical development for several centuries make it natural for a 'special relationship' to exist, irrespective of particular junctures at any given times, such as changing political circumstances, diverse development levels, or relative importance as national states. (Pollack, 1987: 81) Spain's special relationship with Latin America has been extraordinarily long-lived, spanning almost two centuries from the era of Latin American independence in the 1810s. The relationship has been rooted in and constitutive of an ideology of Iberian cultural reproduction, labeled 'Hispanidad' -'that ethnic family that is distinguished . . . by its unyielding adhesion to Catholic truth, and by its epic struggles to defend Catholic unity' (Escudero, 1994: 266) . The metaphors and meanings of this relationship are projections of a patriarchal family, with Spain constructed as the mother (historically, the role of the father is inhabited by God). As Spanish textbooks described colonization, 'Spain did not behave like the mere owner of those lands. More than anything she felt like the mother' (Escudero, 1994: 23; Gooch, 1992) . The family metaphor also justifies continuous relationships with former colonies -'The Empire exists. A mother does not cease being a mother just because her children have married' (Escudero, 1994: 269) .
Thus, Spain's interactions with Latin America are constructed as domestic (in both senses). 'Norms that govern International Relations do not apply to this dimension, where public life is ruled by feelings belonging to the private sphere' (Escudero, 1994: 300) . As the CEO of Spain's state telephone company remarked when contemplating investments in troubled Latin American counterparts, 'For any Spaniard, Latin America is the prolongation of our own land' (Baklanoff, 1996: 117) . When challenged to rationalize aid allocations, the head of Spain's development assistance agency responded, 'Spain cannot be selective in Ibero-America because the measure of our relationship is not just state-to-state. . . . They are family in a real sense because of the many millions of Spanish emigrants and cultural ties that unite us . . .' (Aviel, 1997: 181) . Similarly, the expressed rationale for the Ibero-American summits beginning in 1991 was 'to bring about a family reunion of sorts' (Pujol, 1997: 17) .
During the 19th century, Spain was the declining hegemon of the Western hemisphere as trade and political dominion fell away. During this period, Spain exported large numbers of emigrants to Latin America, along with sporadic (unsuccessful) military interventions and continuing flows of religious personnel. In 1910, over 150,000 Spaniards arrived in Latin America; Spanish migrants were so influential in Argentina that they had portions of the national anthem changed which criticized Spain. According to one study, about half of Latin America's religious personnel still come from Spain (Jorda and Mirabet, 1997; Roy, 1997) .
This influx of Spanish migrants increased during the Spanish Civil War, and in its wake, Franco consciously 'substituted' increased ties to Latin America to counter his dictatorship's isolation from Europe. 'According to Francoists, Spain's importance at the international level did not rest on what Spain was . . . but in what the Latin American nations were and what they might become' (Escudero, 1994: 13) . Alongside a strong diplomatic presence, cultural links were promoted through the Consejo de Hispanidad (est. 1940; later Instituto de Cultura Hispánica). Spanish aid, trade and investment were low, because Spain itself was still relatively underdeveloped -even outranked by former colonies like Argentina and Venezuela.
Once Spanish development improved during the 1970s, economic links with Latin America increased rapidly and preferentially. Spain's relatively small economy meant it accounted for only 9-12 percent of Latin American trade through the 1980s, but aid and investment soared (see Table 2 shown previously) (Baklanoff, 1996; Roy, 1997: 44) . While Spain ultimately profited from these ties, Spain's cultivation of Latin America does not correspond to any straightforward economic logic. Spanish aid, diplomacy and cultural exchange preceded investments by decades, and the trade relationship was never that large or advantageous. Sub-regions such as Central America consistently received high aid and diplomatic attention coupled with low investment (Aviel, 1997) .
Following Spain's 1975 transition to democracy and 1985 integration with the European Union, Spain's identity and Latin American relations became more universalist. The Hispanic Institute was renamed the Institute for Ibero-American Cooperation and given resources and a mandate for development, while Spain began to actively promote democratization in Latin America. Latin America received its own Secretariat of Spain's Foreign Ministry in 1985. A series of Spanish initiatives to commemorate the 1992 Quincentenary highlight the cultural basis for the special relationshipSpain established an Ibero-American Annual Summit, a $20 billion aid fund for Latin America, a $500 million contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank along with a special Indigenous Peoples' Fund and several programs to foster cultural heritage, including the reconstruction of colonial architecture at 60 sites in 17 countries of Latin America (Aviel, 1997) .
Despite some initial resentment of lingering Spanish colonial aspirations, by the 20th century various sets of Latin Americans welcomed and even solicited Spanish involvement. In the 1910s, Latin American intellectuals and social conservatives crafted an ideology of reidentification with Spainhispanismo -which resulted in Iberoamerican conferences and exchange. By the 1930s and 1940s, this revanchist mentality had come to influence populist leaders such as Argentina's Juan Peron, who sought exile in Spain, and Brazil's Getulio Vargas, who allowed his country to be used as a center for Spanish fascists throughout World War II (Atkins, 1989: 290-1 Today, Spain is closely linked to Latin America through aid and investment which build on historic identities. Half of Spain's foreign aid goes to Latin America, and Spanish capital in Latin America surpasses direct investment from the United States (Jorda and Mirabet, 1997; Roy and Jorda, 1997) . Spanish companies now dominate Latin America's telecommunications, electricity, banking and insurance sectors, with substantial investments in airlines and hotels, especially in Mexico, Cuba and Argentina (The Economist, 1997; Los Angeles Times, 1999). By 1996, Spanish bilateral aid to Latin America reached $883 million, the Ibero-American Institute gave an additional $108 million and the European Union (at Spain's urging) had increased its contribution to $500 million (Pujol, 1997) . Spanish export credits add another billion-plus dollars each year to the flow of resources into Latin America. Spain has forgiven or renegotiated its debt with Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela, and has encouraged the EU to do the same (Martinez et al., 1997: 113) .
Spain has also increased its diplomatic and institutional presence in Latin America. This relationship is now simultaneously bilateral, pan-American and inter-regional. At a bilateral level, Spain has signed 540 treaties with Latin American nations, and maintains a higher diplomatic presence than in any other region, including Europe (Jorda and Mirabet, 1997: 65) . On the pan-American side, Spain is the first or only state outside of the Western hemisphere in the regional organizations OAS (Organization of American States), PAHO (Pan-American Health Organization), ALADI (Latin American Integration Association), SELA (Latin American Economic System), CEPAL (Latin American Economic Commission) and the Inter-American Development Bank. Spain has frequently mediated Latin American territorial disputes, and was an active broker of the peace accords in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, hosting peace negotiations in Spain in the latter two cases (Roy, 1997) .
The Ibero-American summits have grown through the 1990s into an 'Ibero-American space' which is a launching ground for cooperation programs and a coordinator for common diplomatic initiatives in global international organizations. Spain's King and Prime Minister attend these summits, but the location is generally Latin American, and the Presidency rotates, with equal participation allotted for each member state. The newer inter-regional relationship between Europe and Latin America, brokered by Spain, recently developed a 1999 EU-Latin America summit involving 33 Latin American nations (Weekly News Update on the Americas, 1999).
Ibero-American ties have not yet fulfilled their full promise, and Spain's special relationship with Latin America has become increasingly diffused through the EU. However, Spain has enhanced the EU-Latin America relationship, including ambassadorial rank EU representatives in all of the Latin American states, Latin American eligibility for the European Investment Bank, a special research institute on European-Latin American relations (IRELA) and a framework for an EU-Mercosur trade pact to culminate in 2005 (Baklanoff, 1996: 115-17) . In addition, 'at the EC, Spain has actively played its role as an advocate of Latin America's interest . . . contributing decisively to the inclusion of the Dominican Republic and Haiti in the new Lome Convention, and obtaining a modest increase in Latin America's share in the EC's development programs ' (Van Klaveren, 1994: 89) .
Demographics and individual identity ties help construct this relationship. Spain has maintained a liberal policy of dual nationality that allows émigrés to hold Spanish citizenship for several generations; this is supplemented by an aid program that allows Spanish descendants in Latin America a free trip 'home' (Jorda and Mirabet, 1997: 60; Los Angeles Times, 1999) . Since the 1970s, Spanish migration has been supplemented by Latin American political refugees to Spain, who have played a significant role in shaping Spain's human rights policies (including the attempt to extradite former Chilean ruler Augusto Pinochet).
Second, Spanish interaction with Latin America has always been constructed in response to other relationships -with the United States and Europe. Both Spain and Latin America have used the special relationship to counterbalance US dominance. Staunch US ally Franco went so far as to defy Kennedy's 1962 naval blockade of Cuba, while contemporary Spanish officials have asserted to the US that Cuba is 'a domestic policy matter for Spain' (Gooch, 1992: 131; Roy, 1997: 240) . Since Spain had openly 'substituted' Latin American relations for regional ties, Latin America feared trade and diplomatic diversion during the 1980s as Spain re-entered Europe. But by the 1990s, Spain had begun to position itself as a 'bridge' between the EU and Western hemisphere; reinsertion in Europe became a base for deepening the special relationship (Baklanoff, 1996; Pujol, 1997) . Although competing commodity trade preferences by the EU for former Spanish and French colonies have led to 'banana wars', Spain has persuaded the European system to incorporate several of the least developed Latin American and Caribbean countries. Europe, in turn, has delegated responsibility for Latin American affairs to Spain, granting the Spanish commissioners Latin America-related posts (Baklanoff, 1996: 116; Roy, 1997: 48) .
Spain's identity-based foreign policy originated under a declining monarchy, and was elaborated by a fascist dictatorship. Yet it continues under democracy, and now reflects public opinion and civic linkages. Polls show that Spaniards are more interested in Latin America than Europe or the US, and support the notion of an 'obligation' to Latin America (Los Angeles Times, 1999) . Spain has a 'Latin America lobby' involving the Socialist Party, many academics, trade unions, most of the media, dozens of NGOs active in the region, aid officials and even some traditionalists nostalgic for 'Hispanidad'. However, this diverse coalition with wide public resonance is much more diffuse and constructed than a traditional domestic interest group. Latin American involvements, in turn, have a feedback effect on Spanish identity. For example, during the 1980s, Spanish promotion of democracy in Latin America helped bolster domestic support for democracy and reconstruct a post-dictatorial nationalism (Grugel, 1997) .
Spanish relations with Cuba, Spain's treasured last American colony, emphasize how identity-based 'family ties' still trump both interest and principle.
11 Even under the fascist Franco regime, Spain maintained close and supportive ties with Castro, in the absence of any observable objective advantage for Spain. Franco maintained agreements for cultural exchange, fishing fleets, air transport and trade with Cuba, defying UN sanctions (Pollack, 1987: 70) . Cuba has had an unusually large number of Spanish immigrants, and a large proportion of these immigrants retained Spanish citizenship for generations. Fidel Castro himself is the son of a Spanish immigrant, who made a symbolically laden return visit to the family birthplace in 1992. Cuba has received almost half of Spain's aid to Latin America, a disproportionate amount of trade (most subsidized), the highest level of official lending, and investments in tourism and transport which are credited with sustaining the island after the collapse of its Soviet patron. These relations were especially warm under Spain's Socialist government, but began under Franco and have persisted despite ideological changes in the mother country.
Meanwhile, the prodigal Cuban leader has castigated Spain's historic role, expelled various Spanish officials -including an Ambassador and visiting Senators, pursued refugees into the Spanish Embassy (which did cause a temporary break in diplomatic relations) and defied Spanish aid conditionality. Spain's 'maternal' response has been to seek greater 'constructive engagement', including resisting US disinvestment policies such as HelmsBurton, fostering Cuban participation in the Ibero-American summits, sending teams of Spanish economists to Cuba to promote economic reforms and offering to broker a democratic transition process (Roy, 1997) . For Spain, Cuba is far more than a distant, struggling island economy, ruled by a defiant dictator; Cuba is part of the family.
Britain and the 'Commonwealth of Nations'
Though the British have been less enthusiastic in public discourse than France and Spain about sustaining post-imperial family ties, the Commonwealth in practical and institutional terms is at least as active and solid as la Francophonie or Ibero-American Hispanidad. This section discusses the effects of decolonization and European integration on the Commonwealth, then assesses the current status of the association in institutional, practical and symbolic terms.
The label 'British Commonwealth of Nations' became popular during World War I. The Commonwealth was seen as a free association of countries whose members (other than the UK) were the larger, self-governing excolonies or 'Dominions' (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and later the Irish Free State). Britain was clearly the hub of dense imperial networks of trade, investment and diplomatic and military coordination. Over the succeeding decades, all of these ties were attenuated. By the 1970s, Britain had withdrawn all of its military outposts from 'East of Suez', and British colonies had either achieved independence or were moving toward it (Rouvez, 1994: 207-11) . During the era of transition, the Commonwealth was at first a dignified replacement for the Empire. Two major shifts transformed the place of the Commonwealth in British International Relations. First, decolonization altered the composition and thus the character of the Commonwealth. Second, the economic prosperity of Britain became increasingly linked to that of the European Community.
Decolonization after World War II was minimally controversial in Britain. Indeed, the major political parties argued about almost everything except decolonization. Two factors account for the broad postwar domestic acceptance of independence for the colonies. First, the British could reasonably believe that independence did not mean a complete severing of ties, for the expectation was that the new states would pass in an orderly fashion through a series of stages, including self-government, Dominion status and, ultimately, membership in the Commonwealth (McIntyre, 1998: 106) . A substantial share of the British population at the time would either have spent time working in the imperial possessions, or known someone who did, or had friends and family who had emigrated to some part of the Empire. For these, the Commonwealth model could be seen as transforming the Empire into something more modern. A second reason that decolonization produced little contention within the UK was that the basic issues had already been settled in stormy debates during the 1920s and 1930s. These debates concerned the future of British ties with the Irish Free State (later Eire, the Republic of Ireland) and with India (McIntyre, 1998: 105) . Tumultuous disputes and hard negotiations led to the creation of the Irish Free State (agreed by treaty in 1921) and a promise of eventual self-rule for India.
As the question of independence for India came to its crucial moment, British officials were considerably unsettled as to what the Commonwealth was or should be. For instance, an officials' committee, created to discuss Commonwealth issues, stated in May 1948 that the ties of the Commonwealth were 'intangible and indefinable'. The British may have been unsure about the nature of Commonwealth bonds, but they were certain the bonds were important. The shift in British attitudes is well captured in changes in official terminology. In 1948, Prime Minister Clement Attlee instructed British ministers and officials to shift their use of terms, replacing 'Dominion' with 'Member of the Commonwealth' and 'Dominion status' with 'fully independent members of the Commonwealth', and removing the word 'British' from the phrase 'Commonwealth of Nations' (McIntyre, 1998: 108-13) .
Ultimately, Nehru accepted a definition of the Commonwealth by which the king was the 'symbol of the free association of its independent member states and as such the Head of the Commonwealth' -a purely symbolic role, without political or institutional status vis-a-vis India. The debates over membership for Ghana and Cyprus included concern that it would open the door to a host of tiny states, which would dilute the importance of the organization. In fact, the small states would later account for over half of the membership, as Commonwealth status by the early 1960s was virtually automatic for the newly independent states.
Simultaneous with these developments, a separate process was also redefining Britain's relationship to the Commonwealth. Six continental European countries were poised in 1956-7 to make a decisive move toward a European Economic Community (EEC). They had invited the UK to participate. Entry into the EC would entail Britain's acceptance of the common external tariff, terminating the free entry of Commonwealth exports into the UK, which had its basis in the system of Imperial preferences first created at the Ottawa conference of 1932. In fact, British officials had promised on several occasions during the 1950s that the privileged access to the UK market enjoyed by Commonwealth countries would never be abandoned for the sake of European integration (Ward, 1997: 93) . Within Britain, opponents of EC membership played up the damage it would do to the Commonwealth, and this became a central factor in the decision in 1955 to withdraw from the deliberations (Ludlow, 1997: 27-38; Ward, 1997: 93) .
Nevertheless, trade with the Commonwealth was declining, and Britain subsequently reconsidered. Even then, the decision to apply for EC membership was hotly contested. The Treasury and the Board of Trade commissioned studies to assess the likely impact on Britain of a common market. The Board of Trade concluded that 'free entry into industrialized Europe might be worth more than preferences in non-industrialized countries', since Commonwealth trade was declining (emphasis in original). Even so, both the Treasury and the Board of Trade ultimately decided that the UK should not seek membership in a common market because it would, among other things, undermine Commonwealth trade preferences (Young, 1995: 95) . British opposition to the EC also repeatedly stressed the 'loyal' support of Commonwealth and imperial countries during the two world wars. The left and the right, however, held radically divergent views of the future of the association. The right wing of the Conservative Party hoped for a revival of imperial ties so as to make Britain a world power; those on the left saw the Commonwealth of the future as 'a multiracial family cooperating to combat inequality' (Wilkes, 1997: 24-5) .
Nevertheless, by the time of Britain's third application in 1971, most observers expected Britain to reach for a successful outcome, even if it meant sacrificing Commonwealth ties (Ward, 1997: 105) . On the same day that Parliament voted to approve British entry into the European Economic Community (28 October 1971), a second bill further attenuated Britain's ties to the Commonwealth by restricting non-white immigration from the former colonies (McIntyre, 1991: 68) . Because of the broader trends represented by these bills, by the mid-1970s Britain was part of a Commonwealth that was no longer called 'British', in which the majority of members were relatively small ex-colonies, not the traditionally more fraternal Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders. Furthermore, the expansion of the membership was making the regular meetings increasingly argumentative, with Britain frequently the focus of ire.
Many of the newly independent states regularly harangued the British at Commonwealth meetings for their failure to resolve the crisis created by Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (1965) , and for their refusal to use forceful means to compel the white government there to move toward free elections and majority African rule. Two Commonwealth countries, Tanzania and Ghana, broke diplomatic relations with Britain over the issue, though without dropping out of the Commonwealth (Rouvez, 1994: 202) . Indeed, the disagreement over Rhodesia provoked calls for Britain's expulsion from the Commonwealth. Whereas Rhodesia dominated Commonwealth meetings in the 1960s and 1970s, South Africa was the touchstone issue of the 1980s. Under Margaret Thatcher, Britain steadfastly refused to join in comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa, and was regularly and roundly condemned by other Commonwealth members.
Given the criticism directed at Britain in Commonwealth meetings, and given the reorientation of British economic interests toward the EC, it is not surprising that the perceived importance of the Commonwealth declined in Britain. One way of documenting this shift is through the changing bureaucratic organization of British foreign relations. (Cross, 1967: 47-61; Kitchen, 1996: 143) . The shifting bureaucratic designations aptly illustrate the initially rising importance of Commonwealth relations, after which they become subsumed under a broader rubric, with 'Foreign' coming first both in language and in substance.
Although British interest in the Commonwealth was gradually cooling from the 1960s through the 1980s, the association was becoming the most densely institutionalized of the three post-imperial families of states. Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah proposed in 1964 that the Commonwealth create a permanent secretariat, which the 1965 summit agreed to do. Up to that time, the British Cabinet Secretary had acted as secretary-general to the meetings of Commonwealth prime ministers. The Secretariat's budget derives from assessments on each member government. In 1988 it totaled £6.5 million; Britain contributed 30 percent of that sum, Canada 16 percent and Australia 8 percent (Adamson, 1989: 12-26) . The fiscal 1998-9 budget for the Secretariat was £10.5m (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001) . Its staff grew from 41 in 1966 to 410 in 1990 410 in (McIntyre, 1991 .
The Secretariat has a dozen functional divisions that provide practical services and technical assistance to member governments, and promote interchange both among governments and among non-governmental associations. Secretariat, 2000 Secretariat, , 2001 . The primary political event of the association is the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held every other year. These Commonwealth summits have been taking place since 1944 (by comparison, the Ibero-American summits began in the 1990s). The summits are informal, as the Commonwealth possesses no constitution or binding rules. Though the meetings do not produce formal legal agreements, they have generated a series of declarations, which amount to statements of shared principles (Kitchen, 1996: 143) . These have been sufficiently broad to achieve consensus, endorsing, for instance, equality, human rights, development and cooperation, and condemning racism and apartheid in 1971 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001) .
In addition to fostering intergovernmental ties, the Secretariat also seeks to promote the activities of trans-Commonwealth non-governmental organizations and professional associations. The former 'Commonwealth OnLine' website listed scores of such groups that are affiliated with the Commonwealth or serve some subset of its members. These cover the full spectrum of substantive areas, from the Commonwealth Association of Architects to the Commonwealth Veterinary Association (Commonwealth OnLine, 1999; see also Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001 ). Indeed, it may well be that the non-governmental networks and interactions are the most significant aspect of the organization, a conclusion already suggested in 1969 (Ingram, 1969) .
In terms of cultural reproduction, as McIntyre puts it, 'The most popular aspect of the Commonwealth is sport' (McIntyre, 1991: 219) . Another observer writes that 'sport is what most of the Commonwealth has in common as much as the English language, more so than law or institutions' (Adamson, 1989: 133) . International cricket and rugby tournaments invariably involve, and have huge audiences in, several Commonwealth countries. The Commonwealth Games are also widely popular, with a television audience numbering in the hundreds of millions and athletes from even the smallest island states (McIntyre, 1991: 236) . Adamson (1989: 137) states that they have become 'arguably its [the Commonwealth's] second most important gathering, ranking after the summits and ahead of other ministerial meetings'.
Britain's links to the Commonwealth are based primarily on language, law, education and sport, and are thus chiefly cultural and normative, not economic. Tying it together is an imagery of 'family'. The first references to the British Empire as a family of nations appeared in the 1860s and 1870s (McIntyre, 1998: 16) . Today those references continue, for example, in the official website of the Commonwealth Secretariat, which defines the organization as 'a unique family of 54 developed and developing nations around the world' (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001) . A separate website sponsored by the Commonwealth Business Council told visitors that the Commonwealth is 'a ''family'' of nations, originally linked together in the British Empire, and now building on their common heritage in language, culture, law and education' (Commonwealth OnLine, 1999) . The membership of the family is indeed diverse, including some of the world's richest countries (the UK, Canada) and some of the poorest (Tanzania, Bangladesh). The Commonwealth has members from virtually every regionNorth, Central and South America; the Caribbean; Africa; South Asia; East Asia; and the Pacific. It is also larger than the other post-imperial groupings -whereas the Spanish-speaking American states number about 20, the Commonwealth currently has nearly triple that number.
The cultural diversity of the Commonwealth may, in fact, be one reason for the recent modest renewal of British interest in the organization. Britain, with significant communities from Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia, is becoming conscious that it is a much more multicultural society than ever before. The 'minority' populations, of course, have their origins in Commonwealth countries. For instance, with its large Caribbean population, Britain is 'now ''technically'' the third largest West Indian island in the world', albeit without the sunshine (Payne, 1991) . The Commonwealth is, in this sense, increasingly visible within Britain itself.
The importance of the Commonwealth in Britain's foreign relations has waxed and waned over time, but never in response to cold assessments of its costs and benefits for the UK. Still, from time to time, British governments have attempted to weigh the costs and benefits of participation in the Commonwealth. For instance, the Macmillan government in the early 1960s arrived at a somewhat skeptical 'kind of ''balance and loss'' account of the British relationship with her Commonwealth', yet never contemplated abandoning the Commonwealth in order to join the EC. Later, the Wilson government who believed that the Commonwealth had a mission that was not reducible to British trade interests or the bonds of history; it was instead 'a multi-racial community and potential force in the world' (Boyce, 1999: 191-3) . The 1969 Duncan Report, prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, included an effort to assess costs and benefits, and concluded that Commonwealth relations should be maintained, but with a diminished importance in British diplomacy.
The most recent official attempt to weigh the importance of the Commonwealth comes to a more enthusiastic conclusion. In April 1996, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, following an extended study, issued a report on The Future Role of the Commonwealth. The report is less about the Commonwealth itself than it is about its importance for Britain in the near future.
12 Though the report mentions the economic and political payoffs of the Commonwealth for the UK, it does not attempt anything like a systematic weighing of costs and benefits. If one looked to the report for hard evidence that the benefits are greater than the costs, the case would remain unproven. Yet the report strongly endorses the continuation and strengthening of Britain's ties with the Commonwealth, citing its 'great potential future value'. Part of that value resides in trade and investment, but it is built 'upon the natural affinities of shared language and a core of political and cultural beliefs'. Thus, equally important as political and economic relations are the 'promotion of democracy, good governance, and human rights' (UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 1996) .
The studies and reports always fall short of providing a clear balance sheet. Indeed, our theoretical framework makes clear why such an appraisal is impossible -post-imperial ties are based largely on intangible values like shared history, cultural and linguistic affinities and conceptions of identity, and not primarily on material costs and benefits. Indeed, we would argue that it is the broader support for the Commonwealth that shapes the interpretation of both its costs and benefits. In the end, British assessments of the Commonwealth boil down not to judgments regarding its importance in economic or strategic terms, but to assertions of its value as a set of relationships that are part of what it means to be British.
Since the 1996 report, the Commonwealth has enjoyed a noticeable revival in British foreign policy-making. The government designated 1997 the 'Year of the Commonwealth' (McIntyre, 1998: 125-8) and the language of 'family' was again in use. 13 In a Commonwealth Day speech in the House of Commons, Robin Cook, MP and future cabinet member, noted that 'two out of every three children at school in Britain have, somewhere, a relative elsewhere within the Commonwealth', adding more concrete meaning to the idea of a 'family of nations' (UK House of Commons, 1997). As we have argued, and parallel to the cases of France and Spain, the language of family is not simply coincidental, but is a part of the construction of British identity.
Finally, the May 2000 intervention by British troops in Sierra Leone would have been unimaginable without the historical relationship of Empire and Commonwealth. The intervention could not have been justified by economic or strategic interests, but only as a responsibility deriving from ties that were seen as familial.
Conclusion
Comparison of the post-colonial relationships of Spain, France and Britain reveals fundamental similarities of structure and ideology, along with some important differences in content. Above all, there is a surprising convergence in the creation of post-colonial diplomatic structures, economic preferences and cultural exchange by European powers which differ in domestic characteristics (size, power, changing regimes), nature and timing of the colonial experience and key features of the receiving areas of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia. Across these diverse cases, the special relationship is paralleled by an identity-based rationale for foreign policy, and a disproportionate emphasis on the 'fourth dimension' of culture and ideology within that relationship. As the cases show, the concrete economic and security interests of realist theories, in both their broader and narrower variants (see above), cannot explain the nature of the post-imperial ties. Neither can a domestic politics argument focusing on firms with specific interests in the former colonies account for those relationships. However, a domestic politics argument emphasizing the role of segments of the foreign policy elite (the 'bureaucratic politics' variant described earlier) is fully compatible with our argument and our evidence.
Our argument does not deny that within enduring post-colonial relationships, the shape and weight of each relationship has shifted over time. The French 'family' has been the most stable, although the mechanisms and intensity of interaction declined somewhat as of the 1980s, and have recently come under growing attacks. For Spain, on the other hand, post-colonial institutions and resources increased over time, along with Spanish capabilities to pursue perceived post-colonial interests. Britain's more ambiguous commitment slowly waned but has recently rebounded. These shifts do not undercut our central claim. Familial identities strongly filter perceptions of objective changes, but certainly do not suppress them entirely. Even with such fluctuation, these relationships still differ systematically and persistently from the modal patterns of International Relations.
Just as 'unhappy families show their troubles in different ways', postcolonial families of nations have contrasting qualities as well. Overall, the 'Latin' countries of France and Spain show more similar patterns than Anglo-Saxon Britain, with tighter ties, more lasting influence, and more explicit cultural export. France has the highest level of structural dependence, followed by Spain, with Britain trailing. Forms of influence also differ -France plays a unique role in post-colonial military intervention, Britain offers higher trade preferences and Spain emphasizes aid and diplomacy. Even within the category of cultural influence, France concentrates on language, Spain has historically intertwined language and religion, while Britain appears neutral in this regard. However, British promotion of its legal, educational and athletic cultures may parallel Latin linguistic proselytization. Finally, although the general mechanism in all three cases consists of the internalization of a diffuse ideology by a tight foreign policy elite, civil society seems to play a more important role in the contemporary Spanish relationship with Latin America.
Our focus on international relationships rather than autonomous national interest also suggests that differences in broader French, British and Spanish identities create differences in their post-colonial families. Thus, Britain's looser post-colonial involvements are partly an inverse function of AngloAmerican partnership. Relatedly, Britain received a central role in global international organizations (a kind of 'hegemon emeritus') diminishing its lingering identification with Empire. Spain and France, by contrast, sought to balance problematic relationships with the US (and with Germany in the European Community) through intensified ties to their old neighborhoods. These were constructed relationships rather than simple power balancing, however; France rejected the potentially more advantageous option of fullfledged Atlanticism, and Spain's exclusion from Europe reflected political ideology rather than geopolitics. Moreover, the special partners chosen offered little real capability to rebalance the broad distribution of power.
Finally, a feminist interpretation of the international projection of family relationships suggests a differentiated understanding of how foreign policy will tend to create not simply 'families of nations', but different types and styles of families. The differences in closeness, control and culture of the three post-colonial groups described here correlate with differences in the family styles and domestic culture of the three European powers.
What are the broader implications for the study of world politics? This comparative, analytical approach attempts to push beyond previous attempts to interpret foreign policy through more limited notions of 'national character', to construct a generalizable, middle-range explanation based on the construction of identity rooted in specific patterns of history, ideology and family relations. This study could thus be expanded to include the emerging post-colonial relations of the European Union, which show disproportionate influence from the states in this study (in contrast with the general preponderance of German influence in the EU). Future research could fruitfully compare this study with other post-imperial relationships in and beyond Europe, to test whether these interactions have shaped the national identity of the former imperial power in similar ways. More generally, scholars should extend studies of the origins and dynamics of different types of communities of nations, transcending the false dichotomy between anarchy and homogenous international society.
Notes
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments.
1. Our structural approach employs only one of several mechanisms through which feminist scholars analyze the translation of patriarchy into foreign policy. For leaders and elites, internalized psychological structures derived from family socialization may shape individual decision-making. At the organizational level, the dominance of male foreign policy bureaucrats may skew national goals and approaches. Across states, deeply gendered discourses of national identity may color 'generic' ideologies such as nationalism, religion or communism/anticommunism. At our level of analysis, structural approaches see all forms of power as a projection of patriarchal hierarchy and dualism, such as the distinction between foreign and domestic relations. See Maalki (1994) and Sylvester (1994) . 2. An interesting question is why the post-colonial relationships examined here took on a metaphorical family dynamic, whereas comparable kinds of relationships did not, for example, the one between Japan and Korea. We would suggest that the nature of the decolonization process had much to do with this difference. The colonies of France, Spain and Britain mostly obtained independence either through armed revolt or through negotiated transitions (mainly in the 1960s and 1970s). Japan, and Germany earlier, lost their imperial possessions through defeat in great-power wars. There was thus no chance for familial post-colonial relations to evolve. An interesting counterfactual speculation is to ask whether, had Germany and Japan divested themselves of colonies in the 1960s, the relationships would have been more similar to those that developed between France, Spain and Britain and their former colonies. Another hypothesis is that European empires and decolonization were culturally distinctive, and therefore post-imperial ties were different, a worthy question but one far beyond the scope of this article. 3. John Ravenhill's analysis of the 'collective clientelism' strategy of the Lomé countries in seeking privileged economic relations with the European Commu-nity shows the ways in which historical ties shaped the political economic strategies of the ex-colonies. See Ravenhill (1985) . 4. This has continued throughout the history of the European Union -since the 1950s, French attempts to secure European aid for their ex-colonies have cost them concessions on other issues. 5. As John Ravenhill notes in an argument consistent with our own, not only did Europeans perceive continued ties as profitable in various ways, but ex-colonies aggressively framed demands for special treatment in the Europeans' rhetoriclaying claim to even more benefits than Europeans were inclined to offer (Ravenhill, 1985) . 6. Guinea would spend the next three decades recovering privileged relations with France. 7. France even moved to 'adopt' the troubled Belgian ex-colonies of Zaire and Rwanda in the 1960s and 1970s. 8. Mitterrand had argued that Africa was a direct extension of France, a 'nationcontinent balanced around our metropole', in his book, Aux frontières de l'Union française (Mitterrand, 1953: 148 Table ( 1996: 259) .
